Research

My overarching research project is a response to the dominant theory that a state is the monopoly of legitimate violence. I propose an Aristotelian theory of the state, where the state is an association that is built upon a self-sufficient association and has as its goal the common good. The common good consists in creating a public realm where honor (understood as striving to live a life worth remembering) is remembered and exercising a type of authority which has as its standard non-domination (I call this kind of authority “republican rule”).

I am currently focusing on the common good half of the project. The common good half of the project makes two claims, each of which is supported by a distinct theoretical structure. The claim that we should have a public realm where honor (understood as striving to live a life worth remembering) is remembered rests upon a system about the virtues connected to honor, like magnificence. Hence this claim requires a theory of the public realm as its support, a theory that can be understood as a virtue ethics of splendor and vice.

The second claim is about exercising a type of authority which has as its standard neo-republican non-domination, I call this kind of authority “republican rule”. I argue that republican rule is one kind of rule among many. Hence this claim requires a theory of rule as its support, a theory that can be understood as role morality of authority relations. Because these two theories are rather distinct, even if both are inspired by similar sources (particularly Aristotle), I am currently working on completing the theory of rule before moving on to the theory of the public realm.  

Theory of Rule / Role Morality of Authority Relations

The basic structure of the theory of rule (role morality of authority relations) is that there are four different kinds of authority relations or rule: rule between free and equal peers (civic rule), rule over free but dependent persons (guardianship), rule over free independent and unequal people (administration), and rule over the unfree (mastership). Each of these kinds of rule has its own normative standard of behavior, particularly of what is required from the ruler.

There are two literatures that I am centrally in conversation with to be able to build the theory of rule: the neo-republican non-domination scholars and the Aristotelian political rule and economics scholars. In conversation with the republican nondomination scholars, I am working on what counts as being dominated by someone in a position of authority. While the literature seems to be concerned with finding the single definition of domination that encompasses all cases of domination, my contribution is trying to show that there are distinct kinds of domination. These distinct kinds of domination depend on which of the four kinds of authority relation the person is under.

In conversation with the Aristotelian political rule and economics scholars, I argue that the structure of the four kinds of rule can be found in Aristotle. At the start of the Politics, and in other parts of it, Aristotle lists four kinds of rule: arche politike, arche basilike, arche oikonomike, and arche politike. Throughout the Politics, but particularly in Book I, Aristotle elaborates on what constitutes each of these four kinds of rule and what is required by each of them from the ruled person, but mostly what is required from the ruler. Since my theory of rule is based on this interpretation of Aristotle’s four kinds of rule, the project spends time exegeting what Aristotle himself thought out these four kinds of rule.

Some of the working papers that compose this project are:

Freedom as Non-invasion: A Case of Domination from Regular Dependence of Resourcing

Domination Through Neglect and False Peer Relations: The Case of Higher Education

Accountable to Whom? Private Government and Domination in the Workplace

Aristotle’s Offices: Authority in the Household and a Case of Political Rule

Aristotle’s Political Economics: Arche Oikonomike in the Polis

Theory of the Public Realm / Virtue Ethics of Splendor and Vice

The central claim of the theory of the public realm (virtue ethics of splendor and vice) is that there are certain virtues that are centrally developed through the public realm: magnificence, magnanimity, and love of honor. These three virtues are connected to honor, understood as striving to live a life worth remembering. The basic structure of the virtue ethics of splendor and vice is analyzing the role that the fine (kalon) has in ethics. The two aspects of this analysis are firstly the differences and similarities between the fine (kalon) and the splendid (thaumaston), and secondly the centrality of the fine (kalon) and foul (aischron) for what we ought to do and avoid.

Some of the working papers that compose this project are:

Aristotle’s Magnificence, Aiming at Excellence of Effect and Splendid Expenditure. Ancient Philosophy, 44 (1):185-200 (2024)

Aristotle’s Selfless Heart: Against the Egoism Reading